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Introduction 
The traditional question in philosophy of mind of the compossibility or co-tenability of 
materialism, on the one hand, and the existence of experience on the other is a theme 
throughout David Lewis’s work.  His first published paper, (1966) ‘An Argument for the 
Identity Theory,’ was a defence of materialism.  And one of his most famous posthumous 
papers (2009) ‘Ramseyan Humility’ contains a discussion of the identification thesis, the 
rejection of which is crucial to his account of experience. In between, papers such as (1972) 
‘Theoretical and Psychophysical Identifications’, (1978) ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’, (1983) 
‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’, (1988) ‘What Experiences Teaches’, ‘(1994) 
‘Reduction of Mind’, (1995) ‘Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?’ and others contain a 
systematic and extremely influential approach to this topic. 
This approach might usefully be viewed as the conjunction of four elements. Element 
#1 is materialism1 for which Lewis gave a distinctive and well-known characterization. 
Element #2 is an account of what experience is: experience is the occupant of a certain 
functional role implicitly set out by folk psychology. Element #3 is an account of the source 
of the tension between experience and materialism:  the truth of materialism is apparently 
inconsistent with the existence of experience if we adopt a conception according to which 
experience is construed as satisfying all of the requirements of folk psychology. Element #4 is 
a strategy for resolving the tension:  Lewis argues that while the existence of experience may 
preclude materialism on the conception just mentioned, it is possible to articulate a different 
conception, according to which experience is construed as satisfying most (but not quite all) 
of the requirements of folk psychology. In this sense “it is not altogether wrong to call him an 
eliminativist, but see how much he eliminates and how much he retains” (1995, p. 329) 
In the first part of this paper I will review these four elements of Lewis’s account of 
materialism and experience. In the second I will consider two recent objections to that 
account. The first argues that knowledge-how is a certain kind of knowledge-that and in 
consequence Lewis’s well known ‘ability hypothesis’ fails.  The second argues that if Lewis’s 
contextualist approach to epistemology is correct, his rejection of the identification thesis is 
impossible.  I will suggest that Lewis has the resources to answer both objections, but I will 
end by stating where in my view the real problems for Lewis lie.  
 
Element #1:  Materialism 
Lewis did not just give a distinctive and well-known characterization of materialism, he gave 
two: one in terms of fundamental properties, and one in terms of supervenience.  The 
fundamental properties definition starts, he says, from something he believes a priori (1994, 
291), namely, that any possible world at all instantiates a relatively small class of fundamental 
properties, where ‘fundamental’ or ‘perfectly natural’ properties are (among other things) “not 
at all disjunctive, or determinable, or negative. They render their instances perfectly similar in 
some respect.  They are intrinsic; and all other intrinsic properties supervene on them” (2009, 
204). On the assumption that what Lewis believes here is not merely a priori but necessary, 
one might think that materialism is the thesis that every fundamental property in any possible 
world at all is physical.  But this construes materialism as necessary if true, when it is usually 
taken to be contingent. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Acknowledgements:  I am grateful to Paolo Santorio and to Wolfgang Schwarz for very helpful comments on a 
previous draft. 
 
1 Some might prefer ‘physicalism’ to ‘materialism’, but Lewis did not and I will follow him here. For a 
discussion of the issues lying behind the phraseology, see Stoljar 2010, ch.1. 
For: Loewer and Schaffer (eds) Lewis Volume 
	   2	  
A better approach is to provide what is sometimes called a ‘world-relative’ definition of 
materialism, i.e., one that tells us what it is for materialism to be true at some possible world 
arbitrarily chosen: 
 
M1. Materialism is true at a possible world w iff every fundamental property instantiated at 
w is physical 
 
Given this definition, the materialist about a possible world W believes that every 
fundamental property at W is physical.  But of course we don’t normally speak of 
philosophers as materialist (or not) about this or that possible world; we speak of them as 
materialists (or not) without qualification, i.e. as just materialists. What is it then according to 
M1 to be a materialist without qualification?  To be a materialist without qualification is from 
this point of view to be materialism about one possible world in particular, viz., the actual 
world. This has the benefit of portraying materialism as if true a contingent truth, because it is 
a contingent truth (if it is a truth) that the fundamental properties instantiated at the actual 
world are physical properties.  The dualist or the vitalist, for example, will say that at least 
some of these properties are psychological or biological. Neither dualism nor vitalism is 
impossible, it is simply that neither is true or at any rate not if materialism is true. 
 Turning to the supervenience definition, this focuses on the idea of two possible 
worlds being, as Lewis says, duplicates of one another (1983, 27).  Lewis starts his discussion 
here by portraying materialism as the thesis that, for any two possible worlds, if they are 
duplicates with respect to the physical, they are duplicates simpliciter. But, as he notes, this 
again wrongly treats materialism as necessary if true.  As before, a world-relative account is 
better:   
 
M2. Materialism is true at a possible world w iff for any possible world w* if w and w* are 
physical duplicates, they are duplicates simpliciter.  
 
Like M1, M2 permits materialism to be a contingent truth, if it is true at all. If dualism is true 
at the actual world, there will be at a least one world that is a physical duplicate of the actual 
world but is not a duplicate simpliciter, i.e. because it is different psychologically. 
 As Lewis notes, M2 faces an important counterexample.  Consider a putatively possible 
world ε, which is physically exactly like our world but which contains some additional 
epiphenomenal ectoplasm:  some stuff that is non-physical and yet does not in anyway disrupt 
the physical goings on in the world.  Such a world seems possible; in particular, the 
materialist should not deny its possibility in view of the contingency of materialism.  But M2 
has the consequence that if materialism is true, ε is impossible. For if materialism is true, and 
M2 is the definition of materialism, any world physically exactly like the actual world is 
exactly like it in all respects.  But ε is a counterexample to this:  it is a world that is physically 
like the actual world but which is not exactly like it.  Hence, M2 is mistaken. 
To deal with this problem Lewis appeals to the notion of an alien property, where a 
“property is alien to a world iff (1) it is not instantiated by an inhabitant of that world; and (2) 
it is not analysable as a conjunction of, or as a structural property constructed out of, natural 
properties all of which are instantiated by inhabitants of that world” (1983, 37).2 In the light 
of this, it is possible to modify M2 as follows: 
 
M3. Materialism is true at w iff for any possible world w*, if (a) w* and w are physical 
duplicates, and (b) w* contains no natural properties alien to w; then w* and w are 
duplicates simpliciter. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As Paolo Santorio pointed out to me, there is at least the following problem with this definition of an alien 
property:  it apparently counts as alien any property which meets (a) and (b) and would be instantiated in worlds 
that have the same laws as ours.  I will not try to deal with this problem here. 
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Unlike M2, M3 does not have the truth of materialism entailing that ε is impossible, since ε is 
a world that includes properties alien to the actual world, at least if we suppose that 
epiphenomenal ectoplasm is or instantiates alien properties.  
  What is the difference between the fundamental property and supervenience 
definitions, i.e. between M3 and M1?  One might think they are different in that one makes 
use of the notion of a fundamental property while the other does not.  But this is not so. First, 
fundamental or at least natural properties are implicit in Lewis’s definition of duplication and 
so in his definition of supervenience (Lewis 1983, 27). Second, as we have seen, Lewis 
appeals to alien properties in M3, and these are defined in terms of natural properties.   
One might think that the two definitions are different in that one makes use of modal 
notions and in particular supervenience while the other does not.  But this is not so either.  
Fundamental properties, as Lewis conceives them, are properties “which figure in a minimal 
basis on which all else supervenes” (2009, 205), so there is clearly a modal element in M1 
too. Indeed, both M1 and M3 include at some level both supervenience and fundamentality. 
One might also think that the two definitions are equivalent or at least that Lewis 
thinks that they are.  But Lewis does not say that they are equivalent. In fact, in ‘New Work 
for a Theory of Universals’, the 1983 paper in which he explicitly advances the supervenience 
definition, he considers the fundamental properties definition3 and rejects it in the following 
passage: 
 
Couldn’t there be a natural property X (in the nature of the case, it is hard to name an 
example!) which is shared by the physical brains in worlds like ours and the immaterial 
spirits that inhabit other worlds? Or by this worldly quarks and certain otherworldly 
particles that cannot exist under our physics?  Physics could quite properly make no 
mention of a natural property of this sort.  It is enough to recognize the special case 
applicable to our world, X-cum-physicality, brainhood or quarkhood as it might be.  
Then, if by physical properties we mean those that are mentioned in the language of 
physics, a Materialist ought not to hold that all natural properties are instantiated in our 
world are physical properties. (1983, 34) 
 
The suggestion here seems to be that the fundamental properties definition—M1, in our 
terms—is mistaken because it erroneously requires materialism to be false in the situation in 
which X is instantiated.  After making this suggestion, Lewis goes on immediately to consider 
the supervenience definition (i.e. M3 in our terms), which suggests that this is his reason for 
abandoning M1 in favour of M3. 
 But it is very difficult to see this passage as containing a good reason for abandoning 
M1 in favour of M3.  First, and this is merely ad hominem, in other papers (e.g. 1994) Lewis 
operates with the fundamental properties formulation and there is no suggestion that it is open 
to an objection that the supervenience definition is not.  Second, if it worked against M1, this 
objection would also work against M3.  For suppose Lewis’s property X is instantiated. 
Presumably X is either necessitated by the physical or it is not.  Suppose it is not necessitated; 
then it follows that M3 is false too. For in that case it follows that there is a world which (a) is 
a physical duplicate of our world; (b) instantiates no further alien properties; but (c) is not a 
duplicate simpliciter, i.e., because it does not instantiate X.  Now suppose it is necessitated by 
the physical; then X presents no problem for M3, but likewise it presents no problem for 
M1—for a proponent of M1 might reasonably reply that X is a property like many others 
which is necessitated by the fundamental physical properties but is not itself a fundamental 
physical property. Finally, waiving these issues of necessitation, it is not clear that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Lewis in fact discusses the view that all natural properties are physical properties, rather than all fundamental 
properties, but I will take him as talking about the fundamental properties definition too—the reference to 
‘quarks’ in the passage at least is suggestive of it.  
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objection does work.  For suppose there were a fundamental property unrecognized by 
physics but which imposed a genuine objective similarity on physical brains and immaterial 
spirits.  It is quite natural to think that in this case that materialism is false, just as both M1 
and M3 predict; hence there is no problem for either here. 
 Part of what makes this objection difficult is the reference in it to Lewis’s account of 
what it is for a property to be a physical property. No definition of materialism, and in 
particular none of M1-M3, is complete without an account of what a physical property is.  As 
Lewis says in the passage just quoted, “by physical properties we mean those mentioned in 
the language of physics”, and in the same paper he says which physics he has in mind: 
something very like the one used by contemporary, actual, physicists, though “presumably 
somewhat improved” (1983, 33-4). But such an account faces serious problems. For one 
thing, could there not be properties that are both physical and alien, properties instantiated at 
worlds whose physics is not definable in terms of ours, and yet is in other respects 
recognizably like ours?4 Moreover, consider what Lewis in a later paper (2009, 205) calls 
idlers, i.e., fundamental properties which are instantiated at our world but which play no role 
in physical, or indeed any, theory.  If there are such properties, then no matter what the 
intrinsic nature of such properties, it immediately follows from M1 and M3, together with 
Lewis’s account of a physical property, that materialism is false, for then there will be 
fundamental properties that are not physical by his definition.  Lewis argues that there is no 
reason to deny that idlers are instantiated (2009, 214).  But then by his own account of what 
physical properties he has no reason to believe physicalism!  
In view of the fact that is unclear both what the relation is between M1 and M3, and 
what account of a physical property they presuppose, there are clearly some open questions 
for Lewis’s approach of materialism.  
 
Element #2:  Experience 
In ordinary English, an experience is an event of some sort that in a certain hard to specify 
way engages our (or some salient subject’s) psychology in certain distinctive ways.  Take the 
Royal Wedding between Prince Dullsville and Princess Whatever-her-name-is.  That was an 
experience, or at least was so for the 2 billion people that watched it on television. The 
formation of the solar system, by contrast, was an event but not an experience because it did 
not have the right sort of engagement with our (or anyone’s) psychology.  Obviously spelling 
out the right sort of engagement is a difficult matter.  But however this is done, an experience 
need not in this ordinary sense be a psychological event like a judgement or the onset or 
persistence of pain. The Royal wedding is not a psychological event though it is an 
experience.  One can say, for example, ‘the experience left the Princess a changed person’, 
meaning that the wedding left her changed.   
In the dialect of English spoken by philosophers of mind, ‘experience’ is usually restricted 
to psychological events, and in particular to psychological events associated with sensory 
perception and bodily sensation, such as tasting the champagne, catching a glimpse of the 
Abbey, feeling the ring in one’s pocket, and so on. In some parts of his writing, Lewis uses 
‘experience’ in this way: “I will say experiences when I mean particular events of 
experiencing” (1995, 326), and it is clear in the context that he has in mind psychological 
events.  Lewis also talks of experiential states, which are types of events of experiencing, or 
perhaps properties of these events. The two ideas are not unrelated since an experiencing 
event is naturally thought of as consisting (at least in part) in the onset or having of an 
experiential state, and indeed the word ‘experience’ might legitimately be used for both.  But 
they are also different: an event is something that happens at a particular time and place and 
which cannot be repeated; an experiential state, by contrast, is a type of thing or a property, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Examples like this may be constructed by considering ‘twin-physics’ cases.  See Stoljar 2010, ch.4 and the 
references therein. 
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something that two people can have or be in, and one person at different times can have or be 
in.   
  If experience (in the restricted sense that operates in philosophy of mind) is an event that 
consists in the onset or the persistence of an experiential state, what is it that makes something 
an experiential state?  For Lewis, experiential states are implicitly defined by folk psychology. 
Folk psychology is a tacitly known theory or body of information about how people in general 
act and think; so folk psychology might say that experiences have this sort of feature, and are 
typically brought about this way, and so on.  Lewis thinks that if we can isolate the key 
principles or theses of folk psychology that concern experience, then in principle one could 
use them to construct an explicit definition of what experience is, using the famous Ramsey-
Carnap technique (see Lewis 1972, 1994, 1997).  We will not go into that technique here; for 
us the key point is that experience is that thing which satisfies all or most of the relevant 
principles of folk psychology.  
What then are the relevant principles of folk psychology? Lewis did not give a 
detailed analysis of what folk psychology says about experience; at one point he says he 
offers ‘recipes for analysis’ rather than fully-fledged accounts (1994, 298). Nevertheless, it is 
possible to draw out from his writings some central principles, some of which are more 
controversial than others, some are more general than others, some of which overlap, and 
some of which might turn out to be explained in terms of others.  These are: 
 
Causal Thesis:  when you have an experience5 you are in some inner state which 
typically causes you to behave in various ways, to form other mental states, and which 
is typically caused by certain things in the world.  (Lewis 1966, 1972, 1978) 
Informational Thesis: when you have an experience, you are in a state with a certain 
informational content.  (Lewis 1983a) 
Belief Thesis:  when you have an experience with the informational content p you are 
disposed to form a belief that p (or a similar content). (Lewis 1983a, 1994) 
Something it is Like Thesis: when you have an experience, there is something it is like 
for you to have that experience.  (Lewis 1988)  
Knowing what it is like Thesis:  when you have an experience, you know what it is 
like to have that experience. (Lewis 1988, 1995) 
Ability Thesis:  when you have an experience you have an ability to imagine the 
experience, to remember the experience, and to recognize the experience. (Lewis 
1988, 1994, 1995) 
Identification Thesis: when you have an experience you know the essence of the 
experience, i.e. exactly what it is in an ‘uncommonly demanding sense’. (Lewis 1995, 
1997) 
Self-Intimation Thesis:  when you have an experience you know that you are having 
the experience.  (Lewis 1972, 1996)6 
 
Putting these theses together we arrive at the view that an experiential state is a state that 
satisfies all or most of them.  As we will see, ‘all or most’ part is important.  Consider the 
view that, by definition, an experiential state satisfies all (and not merely most) of these.  And 
suppose now we discover that nothing that exists in a physical world—i.e. a world at which 
materialism is true—could satisfy all of them.  It would follow that nothing that exists in a 
physical world could be an experience; that is, materialism and the existence of experience are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Some of these principles are more naturally expressed in terms of experiencings, and some are more naturally 
expressed in terms of experiential states. I will leave that unresolved in the text. 
 
6 In (1972) Lewis says that self-intimation is an open question, whereas in (1996) is committed to it, as we will 
see below. 
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not co-tenable. On other the hand, if we require only that an experiential state satisfies most of 
these this result may well be avoided.   
 
Element #3: Materialism and Experience in Tension 
We have considered what materialism is for Lewis, and what experience is; I now turn to the 
two main arguments he discusses against the co-tenability of materialism and the existence of 
experience.  
The first—the Identification Argument, I will call it—starts from an inconsistency 
between materialism, the identification thesis, and some agreed-on facts.  Consider the 
following claims:  
  
(1)  If Fred is in an experiential state E, then Fred knows or is in a position to know the 
essence of E.   
(2)  Fred is in experiential state E.  
(3)  The following is at least part of the essence of E:  the experiential state E is identical to 
the physical state P. 
(4) Fred does not know, and is not in a position to know, that experiential state E is 
identical to P.  
  
These claims are inconsistent. If (1) and (2) are true, Fred knows the essence of E.  But if (3) 
and (4) are true, Fred does not know the essence of E, i.e. because to know the essence of E 
would be to know that it is identical to P, and Fred does not know that.  On the other hand, (1) 
is an instance of the identification thesis; (3) follows from materialism as Lewis understands 
it; and (2) and (4) are the agreed-on facts I mentioned. We can all agree, after all, that there 
are agents (or at least could perfectly well be) that both have experiences and are ignorant of 
their physical basis—Fred is just a stand in for such an agent.  If (1-4) are inconsistent, one of 
them is false.  But (2) and (4) are obvious, and (1) follows from what folk psychology says an 
experience is.  Hence (3), and materialism generally, is false.   
One might wonder whether (3) does follow from materialism as Lewis understands it. 
For example, one reason some philosophers find supervenience definitions of materialism 
(such as M3) attractive is that they apparently permit one to be materialist and deny an 
identity between physical states and psychological states.  Be that as it may, for Lewis 
supervenience and identity naturally go together.  Indeed, for him the idea that experience is 
defined in terms of its folk psychological role provides the starting point of a powerful 
argument for the identity theory; this is Lewis’s famous argument for the identity theory set 
out in Lewis 1966 (see also Lewis 1972, 1994; and Armstrong 1968). The first premise of the 
argument is that, where ‘E’ some experiential state, E is the state that satisfies all or most the 
features above.  The second premise is that, where ‘P’ is some physical state, P is the state 
that satisfies all or most of the features above.  The conclusion is that E is, i.e., is identical to, 
P.  The first premise here is supported by the approach to experience we reviewed earlier.  
The second premise is supported on empirical grounds—for example, on the ground that there 
is some state of the brain that is the state that satisfies most of the features above.  And the 
conclusion of the argument follows, Lewis says (1972), “by the transitivity of identity”. 
The second argument against the co-tenability of materialism and the existence of 
experience is the (better-known) Knowledge Argument.  This argument may be set out in 
various ways, but a simple version has it as proceeding from two main premises.  The first 
premise concerns what it is possible for a person to know; in particular, it is possible for a 
person to know all the physical facts as well as every fact that follows a priori from the 
physical facts, and yet not know what it is like to have an experience of certain type. 
Jackson’s (1982) Mary is the best-known illustration of this possibility, and the one that 
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Lewis mostly focuses on.7 The second premise of the knowledge argument is that if this is 
possible then materialism is false.  The conclusion is that materialism is false, or anyway it is 
false if there are facts about what it is like to have certain experiences and if people know 
these facts.    
One might wonder again whether this argument threatens materialism in the form that 
Lewis advances it. Another reason some philosophers find supervenience definitions of 
materialism (such as M3) attractive is that they apparently permit one to be materialist and 
deny the a priori deducibility of the mental by the physical. Such philosophers are a posteriori 
materialists rather than a priori materialists, as it is often put, and on the surface, the 
knowledge argument targets only the a priori materialist.  Be that as it may, for Lewis 
supervenience and a priori deducibility naturally go together; he is an a priori materialist.  The 
reason for this is his commitment to (and understanding of) the ‘two-dimensional’ analysis of 
the necessary a priori. We will not go into the details of that position here.8  Suffice it to say 
that, if materialism is true, and if M3 is the definition of materialism, there is a necessary 
conditional of the form ‘If S then S*’, where S gives precise information about the 
instantiation of every physical property in the world, and also says that no alien properties 
were instantiated, and S* gives precise information about the instantiation of every 
psychological property.  The issue which divides the a priori from the a posteriori materialist 
is whether this conditional is a priori or not.  Lewis thinks that the ‘two-dimensional analysis’ 
of the necessary a posteriori entails that the conditional ‘If S then S*’ is a priori if materialism 
is true (1994, 297; see also Chalmers 1996 and Jackson 1998). Conclusion: a posteriori 
materialism is not a possible position. 
 
Element #4:  Distinct Conceptions of Experience 
If he does not respond to the Identification Argument and the Knowledge Argument by 
rejecting identity or a priori deducibility, how does Lewis respond? In both cases, his strategy 
is, first, to distinguish two different conceptions of experience (or a related notion), and 
second to suggest that while the arguments rely on one conception, the materialist may 
employ another.  The materialist need not insist that his own is the best one, or the perfect 
one, or the one that best answers to ordinary or philosophical thought; but he does need to 
argue that it a legitimate one. 
 This strategy is particularly clear in the case of the Identification Argument. As we 
saw above, if you operate with a conception of experience according to which something is an 
experience only if it satisfies all the requirements of folk psychology, it will follow that the 
Identification Argument is sound and materialism is false.  But Lewis argues that a conception 
of experience that dispenses with the identification thesis is a legitimate one:  something 
which satisfies the other features of experience listed above would still deserve the name 
‘experience’, even if one can imagine a more perfect deserver of the name.  It is in this 
context that Lewis makes the remark about eliminativism that we quoted right at the 
beginning.  Does Lewis deny the existence of experience?  Yes and no; that is, he denies it if 
you mean something that satisfies all the requirements of folk psychology and the 
identification thesis in particular; he does not if you mean something that satisfies most of the 
requirements. 
 In the case of the Knowledge Argument, the ‘two legitimate conceptions’ strategy 
assumes a slightly different form. Here Lewis focuses on two conceptions, not of experience, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Here is Lewis’s own description of the case:  “Mary, a brilliant scientist, has lived from birth in a cell where 
everything is black and white. (Even she herself is painted all over.) She views the world on black-and-white 
television. By television she reads books, she joins in discussion, she watches the results of experiments done 
under her direction. In this way she becomes the worlds leading expert on color and color vision and the brain 
states produced by exposure to colors.  But she doesn’t know what it is like to see color.  And she never will, 
unless she escapes from her cell” (1988, 263).  
 
8 For some discussion of this issue, see Schwarz this volume 
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but of knowing what an experience is like.  On the first, to know what it is like is to know a 
phenomenal fact, where a phenomenal fact is defined as a kind of fact which does not 
supervene on the physical facts, and which (remote cases aside) requires experience in order 
to be known—Lewis calls this the “hypothesis of phenomenal information”.  On the second, 
to know what it is like to see red is (merely) to know how to do something, or to have certain 
ability, viz., to recollect, recognize, and imagine certain experience—Lewis calls this “the 
ability hypothesis”.  Lewis first argues that the Mary example could be described in either 
way:  on the first, she learns a phenomenal fact; on the second she learns some know-how. He 
then argues that if the example is described in the second way there is nothing in it to threaten 
materialism, since materialism does not rule out the possibility that someone might know all 
the physical facts, and yet gain some abilities.  
 Lewis’s responses to these two arguments are different in an important way. In the 
case of the Identification Argument, both conceptions he operates with are present in folk 
psychology, or at any rate so Lewis claims. In the case of the Knowledge Argument, however, 
no such claim is made. In particular, the hypothesis of phenomenal information and the 
conception of knowing what it is like which goes along with it is an overt piece of 
philosophy—a “gratuitous metaphysical gloss” (1988, 290)—and indeed one which is 
question begging, since one can only know what an experience is like in this sense if 
materialism is false. This seems to me a weakness in Lewis’s discussion of the knowledge 
argument in his 1988 paper. The psychological plausibility of the Mary example and the 
argument founded on it is very striking; it is implausible that only those who are in the grip of 
some tendentious metaphysics find them compelling.  It would be preferable here therefore if 
the two conceptions of ‘knowing what it is like’ Lewis’s response requires are plausibly part 
of ordinary thought.   
In “Can a Materialist Believe in Qualia”, the 1995 paper that came out seven years 
after Lewis’s main discussion of the knowledge argument, we find the materials to deal with 
this problem. In that paper, Lewis argues that ‘knowing what it is like’ is a matter of knowing 
the essence of the experience; in other words, knowing what an experience is like is 
explicated in terms of the identification thesis.  Moreover he argues explicitly that this idea is 
built into folk psychology, and is connected to the knowledge how that is involved in the 
ability hypothesis because according to folk psychology one has these abilities because knows 
the essence.  He also says that a commitment to the identification thesis is central to dualist 
thinking, and mentions Kripke (1980) in particular in this connection. While he does not 
explicitly draw the connection the knowledge argument, it is natural to read his remarks as 
applying there too. If so, we may adjust his response to the knowledge argument in a way that 
avoids the problem about folk psychology just mentioned. According to this revised response, 
there are two conceptions of knowing what it is like: the first is merely to have the ability to 
imagine (etc.) the relevant experience, the second is to know the essence of that experience. 
The Mary example can be described in either way, but the materialist can explicitly adopt the 
first.   
 
Know-how and The Ability Hypothesis 
Turning now to objections to Lewis’s account, the first I will consider focuses on Lewis’s 
response to the knowledge argument. As we gave seen, Lewis adopts the ability hypothesis 
here, and argues that Mary gains knowledge-how or abilities rather than knowledge-that when 
she emerges from her cell.  However, a number of philosophers (e.g. Loar 1990, Lycan 1996, 
Stanley and Williamson 2001, Stanley 2010; see also Alter 2001 and Cath 2009) have 
objected that knowing how to do something is simply a kind of knowledge that, and that in 
consequence the ability hypothesis is mistaken. The premise of this objection—that know-
how is a species of know-that—is certainly plausible.  And no one can deny that Lewis 
formulates the ability hypothesis in terms of know-how which is not know-that. The question 
is whether this part of his account might be dropped while key elements of the ability 
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hypothesis are retained—whether there is a ‘fallback,’ as Stanley and Williamson (2001) put 
it. 
The problem is that there is an apparently decisive argument that no fallback is 
possible.  For suppose that knowing how to imagine (etc.) an experience is a kind of 
knowledge that—for example, knowledge of some proposition p.  Either Mary knows p in her 
room or she does not.  Suppose she does.  In that case, a proponent of the ability hypothesis 
may still say that Mary gains some ability on coming out, for it is possible to separate the 
ability from the knowledge-how.9  But what the proponent can’t say is that in gaining this 
ability Mary gains some knowledge-how—for by assumption she already has that knowledge.  
And this means that the ability hypothesis loses a lot of its appeal. Central to the Mary case is 
what might be called ‘the knowledge intuition’, the idea that Mary learns something on 
coming out, (i.e. gains some knowledge on coming out).  If the ability hypothesis can explain 
this by saying Mary gains some knowledge-how, well and good; but if the ability hypothesis 
cannot explain it, it provides no reasonable description of the case. Suppose then that she does 
not know p in her room. In that case, a proponent of the ability hypothesis can say that Mary 
gains some propositional knowledge on coming out, and may appeal to this to explain the 
knowledge intuition.  But the problem now is that the propositional knowledge in question 
cannot be (if materialism is true) the sort of propositional knowledge that Lewis is mainly 
interested in, i.e. the kind that distinguishes one possible world from another.  It is true that 
one can define various notions of propositional knowledge that do not distinguish one 
possible world from another. But Lewis is scathing on the idea that doing so is connected to 
the Mary example. Indeed of the six ways he sets out of missing the point of the knowledge 
argument, no fewer than four are related to this idea!  
Yuri Cath (2009) has suggested nevertheless that the second option here is the best 
one.  His idea is that pre-release Mary might have the propositional knowledge but not under 
the right mode of presentation.  Cath makes a good case that this is plausible for some 
proponents of the ability hypothesis, but it is hard to see it as plausible for Lewis, as indeed 
Cath points out at the end of his paper. If we are out to find a plausible fallback for Lewis, it is 
better to focus on the first horn of the dilemma just outlined, and to try defend the view that 
the ability Mary gains is genuinely a kind of knowledge even if it is not know-how. 
I think such a defence emerges when we observe that a sentence such as ‘Mary knows 
what it is like to see red’ is ambiguous in a way that many ‘know what’ sentences are.  On the 
one hand, it might be used to say that Mary knows some fact that (in the context) answers the 
embedded question ‘what is it like to see red?’ Since that question seems intuitively to ask 
‘what type of experience does one have when one sees a red thing?’ the sentence on this 
reading means that Mary knows some fact that (in the context) answers this question.  Call 
this the ‘interrogative’ reading of the sentence. On the other hand the sentence can also be 
used to say that Mary knows the thing or property denoted by the referring expression ‘what it 
is like to see red’.  Since the referring expression intuitively denotes a type of experience, on 
this reading the sentence says that Mary knows a type of experience, i.e., the one you have 
when you see red. Call this the ‘free relative’ reading of the sentence.  It is the interrogative 
reading we use when we say of pre-release Mary ‘she wonders what it is like to see red’—
what she wonders is not a type of experience, but what fact answers a certain question. It is 
the free relative reading we use when we say of post-release Mary, ‘she loves what it is like to 
see red’—what she loves is a type of experience, not an answer to a certain question.10 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 It is possible for someone to know how to do something without having the ability to do it; witness the 
unfortunate pianist who knows how to play but lacks the ability because she has just lost her arms in a car crash 
(cf. Ginet 1975 Chomsky 1988, Stanley and Williamson 2001, Cath 2009) Similarly, it is possible that Mary 
knows to imagine but does not have the ability, i.e., because she has not had the experience.  
 
10 For the distinction (plus the labels), though not the application to ‘know what it is like,’ I am indebted to 
Schaffer 2010. 
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Which of these readings is Lewis interested in? While he does not explicitly draw this 
distinction, I think it is plausible to interpret him as being concerned mainly with the free 
relative reading.  One data point is that Lewis explicitly says (1988, 286, fn.12) that the 
phrase ‘what experience E is like’ in the larger phrase ‘know what experience E is like’ 
denotes E itself; this strongly suggests he is setting aside the interrogative reading of the 
sentence.  Another data point is Lewis’s second way to miss the point of the knowledge 
argument (1988, 266).  The second way to miss the point, according to Lewis, is to suppose 
that what Mary doesn’t know is an answer to a certain question, viz., ‘what type of 
experiences she will have when sees red for the first time’. Lewis argues that she does know 
an answer to this question, and so ‘knowing what it is like’ should not be understood in this 
interrogative way. 
 Suppose then that Lewis does indeed employ ‘know what it is like to see red’ on its 
free relative reading; in that case, we have a response to the first horn of the dilemma outlined 
earlier.  Mary may well know how to imagine red but she does not have the ability to do so 
until she has an experience.  But why is the ability that she gains properly called a state of 
knowledge?  The answer is that it is the state of knowing a type of experience, i.e. ‘knowing 
what it is like’ on the free relative sense.   
 
Contextualism and the Identification Thesis 
The second objection I want to consider focuses on the identification hypothesis. We have 
seen that Lewis rejects this, but a number of philosophers (Schwarz 2007, Stalnaker 2008) 
have pointed out that doing so seems inconsistent with Lewis’s own contextualist account of 
propositional knowledge.   
According to this account, “subject S knows proposition P iff P holds in every 
possibility left uneliminated by S’s evidence; equivalently, iff S’s evidence eliminates every 
possibility in which non-P” (1996, 422). This account raises a number of questions, but the 
connection to the identification thesis has to do with Lewis’s account of what it is for 
evidence to eliminate every possibility.11  Here is what he says: 
 
A possibility W is uneliminated iff the subject’s perceptual experience and memory in 
W exactly match is perceptual experience and memory in actuality.  (1996, 424) 
 
Pairing this account of the elimination of possibilities with the main part of Lewis’s 
contextualism already has an important consequence for Lewis’s account of experience.  In 
particular, it entails the self-intimation thesis about experience mentioned earlier: that if I am 
in a certain experiential state, I know that I am in that state. Some might think that this is bad 
enough12, but Stalnaker and Schwarz argue that the problem goes deeper. As Stalnaker puts it: 
  
…on Lewis’s account, we will at least know, in any context, that the possibilities 
excluded by our experience—possible situations in which our experience does not 
match our actual experience—are possibilities that are incompatible with our 
knowledge.  The problem is that all of these possibilities will be possibilities in which 
our experience has whatever essential properties our actual experience has.  That is, 
Lewis’s account of knowledge implies that even in our most sceptical context, we will 
know the essential nature of our experiences….Lewis’s account of knowledge entails 
the identification Thesis that he rejects…” (2008, 100)   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 As Wolfgang Schwarz pointed out to me, it is Lewis’s account of what it is to eliminate possibilities that 
generates this problem not the contextualism strictly speaking. I will ignore this however in the text. 
 
12 As Hawthorne (2004) points out, “if I have a visual array with 137 red dots, it does not seem that I 
automatically know that (60, n.26), though Lewis’s account apparently implies that do. 
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To bring this out, suppose I am in an experiential state E; and suppose in accordance with 
materialism of the kind Lewis defends, that this state is identical to some physical state P.  As 
we have just seen, it will immediately follow that I will know that I am in E. Does it follow 
also that I know that I am in P?  According to the objection, the answer is yes. For in all the 
worlds that remain uneliminated by my evidence I will be in P; hence I will know that I am in 
P. And this seems tantamount to the identification thesis.13   
It is hard to overstate what a disaster it would be for Lewis’s account of materialism 
and experience if this objection were correct.  As we have seen, the rejection of the 
identification thesis is crucial to his response to the identification argument, and perhaps too 
the knowledge argument.    But is the objection correct? I think this depends on what it is for a 
subject’s perceptual experience in one world to ‘exactly match’ that subject’s perceptual 
experience in another.  The first thing to say is that what Lewis has in mind here are events of 
experiencing, and as we saw an event is an experience if consists in the onset or persistence of 
an experiential state.  Presumably, therefore, experience e in possible world W will match 
experience e* in possible world W* if and only if they consist in the onset or persistence of 
the same experiential state; for short, if and only if they consist in the same experiential state.  
But what it is for two experiences (in distinct possible worlds) to consist of the same 
experiential state? I think there are two possibilities here.  According to the first, two 
experiences consist of the same experiential state (and so match each other) if and only if they 
consist of experiential states with the same functional role. According to the second, two 
experiences consist of the same experiential state (and so match each other) if and only if they 
consist of experiential states with the same essence.  Two experiences could match each other 
in the first sense and not in the second.  For example, contrast a dualist world D and a 
materialist world M, and suppose that at both worlds I am in pain.  Do the two experiences I 
have in theses different worlds (i.e., the one I have in D and the one I have in M) match?  
According to the first account of matching, they do; but according to the second, they do not. 
The distinction between these two accounts of matching provides an answer to the 
objection made by Stalnaker and Schwarz.14  It is true that if the second account of matching 
is in play, it will follow that I know that I am in P, and this is objectionable.  But if only the 
first account is in play, nothing similar is true:  in some of the possible worlds at which I have 
an experience which matches the actual experience I will not be in P.  Is it reasonable to think 
that Lewis is operating only with the first account?  It would seem so. First, as we saw earlier, 
an experiential state is something defined in terms of its folk psychological role, which 
suggests that it is not defined in terms of its essence. Second, the contextualist program in 
epistemology he outlines could proceed unhindered if only the first account is in play.  If so, 
the objection fails and disaster is avoided.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
I have defended Lewis against these two objections, but I should say for the record that I have 
a number of sharp disagreements with Lewis’s account of experience and materialism, which 
I have set out elsewhere.   I will conclude with a brief statement of what these are. 
Disagreement #1 concerns the ability hypothesis. Lewis’s ability hypothesis focuses 
on the idea of a novel experience—that is, an experience one has not had before—and this 
focus is shared by many contemporary accounts of the knowledge argument, in particular 
acquaintance views, phenomenal concept views and so on.  Now the Mary example is an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Seems tantamount, but perhaps is not quite identical; the identification thesis requires not simply that I know 
that I am P but that I know that E is P.  However, the knowledge described in the text is bad enough.  
 
14 In his (2007), Schwarz suggests something along these lines, but objects that, on that view, one will always 
know that various causal facts involved in having an experience.  I am not sure if that is an objection or not, but 
even if it is it is clearly preferable to knowing the essence of the experience from Lewis’s point of view. 
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example in which someone has a novel experience. But this feature of the example is 
incidental to the persuasiveness of the argument founded on it; other examples can be 
constructed that support that key possibility just as well but which do not involve novel 
experiences.  The ability hypothesis has nothing to say to examples of this kind, and neither 
does any response to the knowledge argument founded on novel experiences (see Stoljar 
2005, 2006, ch. 10). So I think a completely different approach is required.   
 Disagreement #2 concerns the identification thesis.  I agree with Lewis that the 
identification thesis is false, and in that sense with his response to the identification argument. 
But I doubt that the identification thesis plays the role in ordinary and philosophical thought 
that Lewis thinks it does.  For one thing, what is built into folk psychology is an empirical 
question, logically like the question of whether folk physics is a version of medieval impetus 
physics.  But even so, the suggestion that the identification thesis is built into folk psychology 
is something about which we should be sceptical.  It is plausible that folk psychology asserts 
some connection between experience and belief about or knowledge of experience. But there 
are many such theses, and the identification thesis is only one (and a fairly extreme one at 
that); there is so far as I know no good reason to believe that this thesis in particular is built 
into folk psychology (see Stoljar 2009). Nor is it credible to suppose that the identification 
thesis is a presupposition of philosophical thought that is sympathetic to dualism.  Take 
Kripke’s discussion of the modal argument in Naming and Necessity, something that Lewis 
mentions.  Kripke is concerned there to emphasize that there is no distinction between feeling 
pain and being in pain, but I think one can emphasize that without being committed to the 
identification thesis (Stoljar 2006, ch. 11, Stoljar 2009). 
 Disagreement #3 concerns Lewis’s optimism about current science.  We saw earlier 
that, according to Lewis, a property is a physical property if and only if it is expressed by a 
physical theory that is a ‘presumably somewhat improved’ version of what we currently have.  
I think, as I said, that this is subject to persuasive counterexamples (see Stoljar 2010, ch. 4).  
But there is more important issue at stake here.  For Lewis’s discussion of physical properties 
and indeed of materialism itself embodies a quite radical optimism about current science, an 
optimism that is routinely underappreciated, as Jackson noted in his first discussion of the 
knowledge argument (see Jackson 1983).15  Lewis himself thought that physics was very 
nearly complete, i.e. that every type of physical truth was known or nearly so, and that every 
contingent truth follows a priori from physical truths.  Now the question of whether optimism 
or pessimism is true is an example of a disagreement in philosophy that will not easily be 
resolvable, if at all.  Presumably, the dedicated optimist will remain unmoved by reminders 
about the fallibility of humans, and about the history of wrong turns and mistakes in our 
attempts at understanding the world (see Stoljar 2010, ch.5).  Speaking personally, however, I 
find this sort of optimism intellectually alien.  I don’t think scientists believe it, even if they 
occasionally say things that suggest that they do.   And if they do believe it, I think they are 
wrong; I don’t think it is worthy of belief.  Moreover, even if this sort of optimism is by some 
miracle true, I don’t think arguments that presuppose it are persuasive. 
Disagreement #4 concerns what the knowledge argument and similar arguments do 
presuppose.  As I have said, in my view the knowledge argument does not presuppose the 
identification thesis, nor is it essentially focused on novel experiences.  However, I do think it 
presupposes something like the optimism just mentioned, in particular, I think it presupposes 
that we have complete knowledge of the physical or non-experiential world if not in detail 
then at least in outline (Stoljar 2006, 2009a).  But as I have just indicated, that presupposition 
is in my view false (in fact I think the plausibility of these arguments is evidence that it is 
false).  And if it is false, I think it is quite clear where the arguments go wrong.  If we assume 
we have incomplete rather than complete knowledge of the relevant facts, what the 
knowledge argument and related arguments show is the unremarkable truth that experience 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This optimism is distinct from Lewis’s (2009) argument for Ramseyan Humility, as Lewis notes in fn.5 of that 
paper.  
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comes apart from some physical facts (i.e. the known ones), not the remarkable truth that it 
comes apart from all.  
 I know these points are controversial; my aim in this last section was to state my 
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